Throughout my internship, I faced one of the most jarring human rights dilemmas: the disconnect between available resources and those affected. On one hand, I became familiar with various sources, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which seemingly offered hope for better monitoring and sanctioning of human rights violations. The more I read about them, the more I was in awe of the potential they offered for marginalized groups, especially in Peru. Parallelly, I still heard countless stories of discrimination based on nationality and gender identity daily within the region of Lima. I realized that the people who need these essential protections most often cannot access them. But I wondered what specifically played a role in this divergence. By doing so, I aimed to put the concept and application of human rights into perspective to prevent myself from becoming disillusioned with them.
To ratify or to not ratify?
Luckily, I encountered some of these factors during my internship. First, allowing countries to choose whether to ratify human rights tools may weaken institutions’ ability to sanction violations. As I compiled trends from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) decisions about countries that had not ratified the Convención Americana sobre los Derechos Humanos, I studied how this choice complicated the IACHR’s mandate. Although the IACHR was ingenious in interpreting the broad Declaración Americana according to current international law, they required more time and resources than in cases where they could apply the corresponding human rights protection framework. Therefore, this “opt-out” exacerbates the IACHR’s already arduous workload.
Consequently, the IACHR’s respect for sovereignty and self-determination often complicates and undermines its ability to condemn human rights violations. How is this fair to those it is meant to protect? I realized that the IACHR actively mediated between the conflicting interests of victims and member states, which strayed from the ideal of protection. However, they assure minimum safeguards. But is this better than nothing?
To fund or not to fund?
In the same sense, I discovered that the funding of the IACHR relied on member countries, which creates the possibility of using their financing as leverage. Indeed, The IACHR has been experiencing procedural delays in recent years because of funding problems, adding to the strain caused by additional resources needed in cases involving countries that have not ratified the agreement[1]. As the IACHR serves as the last resort for victims when their countries’ legal systems fail them, one must consider how isolating it must feel to encounter yet another obstacle because of inefficiency.
Statistical distortion
Additionally, I realized that the statistical patterns I found in the IACHR’s informes de fondo do not necessarily reflect the reality of human rights in the continent, rather the uneven access to the IACHR’s services. For example, 16 of the 21 IACHR decisions concerning non-ratifying countries concerned the US[2]. This statistical majority does not show a higher prevalence of human rights violations in the US; instead, it suggests how accessibility to the IACHR’s services shapes its jurisprudence. In the admissibility application, plaintiffs must specify rights violated in the alleged situation[3]. This requires a particular understanding of the Declaración Americana, which requires access to the Internet or a legal resource. As both might be unavailable, these factors might bias the diversity of initial petitions.
Similarly, the preferred method of presenting the petition is through their website[4]. Exceptionally, it may be by post, but it still disadvantages petitioners with state-controlled or inefficient mailing systems. Thus, the US’ statistical predominance may simply highlight that these resources are more accessible than other countries in the Americas.
Takeaways after three months
The factors that affect the practical punishment for human rights violations have put me in a dilemma between criticizing the current structure or accepting its flaws. Consequently, my perspective on human rights has grown from an idealistic textbook view to a practical one that requires compromise. Human rights violations do not exist in a vacuum; countless socioeconomic and political factors influence them. Yet, I am left with two questions: Can one be content with a flawed system that may deny protection when it is most needed? Is this enough to settle for less to ensure countries’ participation in cases?
[1] Grave crisis financiera de la CIDH lleva a suspensión de audiencias e inminente pérdida de casi la mitad de su personal, Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 23 May 2016, https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2016/069.asp.
[2] CIDH, Lezmond C. Mitchell, Julius Omar Robinson, Nelson Ivan Serrano Sáenz, Orlando Cordia Hall, Nvwtohiyada Idehesdi Sequoyah, Marlin Gray, Pete Carl Rogovich, Ramiro Ibarra Rubi, Gregory Thompson, Manuel Valle, Jose Trinidad Loza Ventura, Virgilio Maldonado Rodríguez, Tracy Lee Housel, Jurijus Kadamovas y otros v Estados Unidos de América.
[3] Sistema de Peticiones y Casos, Folleto Informativo, Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, p. 18, https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/docs/folleto/CIDHFolleto_esp.pdf
[4] Sistema de Peticiones y Casos, Folleto Informativo, Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, p.19, https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/docs/folleto/CIDHFolleto_esp.pdf